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Preface 
The limited success of the November 1982 meetings of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade underscores the need for a new look at 
the troubled subject of international trade. This report represents just 
such a return to basics. 
This study starts off with the proposition that has been neglected far 
too long-no party to the current world trade disputes has clean hands. 
Americans properly are outraged by the staggering array of barriers to 
our trade. But simultaneously, we seem to be oblivous to the many 
obstacles that we have placed on the exports of our trading partners. 
Progress in achieving a healthier and more open trading system can 
come only from the mutual recognition of the policy shortcomings of all 
sides. On a constructive note, this study concludes with eight proposals 
for breaking the trade deadlock-with the United States taking the lead 
in a new approach to achieving freer world markets. 
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Introduction 
The United States-and many of its trading partners-are drifting to 
protectionism. As a result, we stand to lose much of the benefit of the 
open world trading system which this country has so long and so energet-
ically worked toward achieving. The tide must be turned before we 
repeat the sad, protectionist experiences of the 1930s. 
Yet, at a time of high unemployment and slow economic growth, it is 
natural that American citizens become concerned over a rising tide of 
imports and over the tremendous array of obstacles erected by other 
nations to exports from the United States. These are very genuine con-
cerns. They should not be treated lightly nor dismissed cavalierly. Rather, 
they should be carefully examined in the light of the total impact of 
international trade on the American economy. 
This report presents such an analysis. It does indeed demonstrate that 
many other nations follow protectionist policies that limit their imports 
of goods and services from many countries, including the United States. 
This analysis also shows that many other nations also subsidize or other-
wise unfairly help the industries and companies whose products at times 
achieve rising shares of our domestic market. 
But this report does much more. For one thing, it reminds us of the 
vast array of protectionist measures that have been enacted in the United 
States to restrict imports from abroad. As will be pointed out in some 
detail, the basic reason for the popularity of protectionism is that it can 
be an effective means by which relatively small and well-organized 
groups can use the political process to their advantage at the expense of 
the mass of consumers who are not even aware of the burdens put on 
them in the form of higher prices. Thus, the burdens of protectionism 
can be viewed as a form of hidden tax on the consumer. This study also 
shows some of the many ways in which federal, state, and local govern-
ments discourage our own exports. 
To put the matter bluntly, our hands-as a nation-are not clean when 
it comes to championing freer flows of world trade and investment. 
Moreover, if the United States, and its trading partners, both ignore their 
own barriers to trade and focus exclusively on the protectionist policies 
of others, we may see a substantial worsening of the current deteriora-
tion of trade relations. 
Others have written on the specter of a "trade war" brought on by the 
return of the "beggar thy neighbor" policies of the 1930s, which unsuc-
cessfully attempted to export unemployment from one nation to another. 
Dr. Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor at the Center for the 
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That characterization, at least at present, may be an exaggeration. How-
ever, some analysts have warned that the catalyst for the stock market 
crash of October 1929 was a congressional vote revealing the breakdown 
of the free trade coalition. In light of the large stake that the United 
States has in a healthy international trading and investment system, a 
posture of enlightened self-interest surely is warranted. Moreover, such a 
position also is appropriate in the case of other major industrialized 
nations, notably Japan. 
Scratch an economist and you will find, at least in theory, a free 
trader. But, in the real world, we must be aware that free trade cannot be 
a one-way street. However much we oppose the very real and major bar-
riers enacted by other nations that restrict our exports and world trade 
generally, we have to call attention to domestic protectionist measures-
that is, barriers to trade imposed by the U.S. 
Quite clearly, the American economy and the economies of other 
nations would not benefit from a race to erect higher and higher tariff 
and other restrictive barriers to trade. But reversing the process-
reducing the many barriers to world trade-involves a parallel with the 
danger of unilateral disarmament. The United States cannot blithely fol-
low a policy of free trade without simultaneously encouraging and 
expecting its trading partners to do likewise. 
The burdens of protectionism can be viewed as 
a form of hidden tax on the consumer 
The body of this study contains five parts. The first section presents 
an analysis of the current pressures for increased protection from 
imports. The second section shows the wide variety of obstacles in for-
eign nations that reduce the flow of U.S. exports. The third part of this 
report treats the other side of the coin by showing the important array of 
U.S. obstacles that inhibit our own exports. Part four presents the case 
for free trade from the standpoint of historical experience and analyzes 
both the benefits of open world markets and the costs of protectionism. 
This study concludes by presenting a modern approach to trade policy 
that encompasses domestic changes and international actions that will 
benefit both the American economy and our trading partners overseas. 
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I. The Challenge of Protectionism 
Each year, the United States imports and exports vast arrays of goods 
and services in the world marketplace. They range from automobiles, 
steel, industrial metals, textiles and agricultural products, to brooms, 
data processing equipment, clothespins, transport services, baseball bats 
and works of art. 
To be sure, many, though certainly not all, of the goods traded inter-
nationally are important to the American economy and to the national 
security. Domestic producers in nearly all of the industries mentioned can 
feel the pressures of-and lodge protests against-lower priced competi-
tion from producers in other nations that sell goods in the United States. 
Potentially, any sector of the American economy can feel "hurt" by for-
eign competition-whether autos or clothespins are at stake-and call for 
"protection" from offending foreign competition. The rationale for such 
intervention by our government varies, ranging from "unfair" dumping 
below foreign market prices, to foreign barriers against our exports, to 
our own perceived national security requirements. 
Protectionist sentiment has become one of the major challenges to the 
current policy emphasis on reducing governmental intervention in the 
economy and increasing reliance on the marketplace. A wide range of 
industries has been exerting pressure on the President, Congress, and 
government agencies to restrain the free flow of trade between the 
United States and the rest of the world. At times, the restrictionist impe-
tus comes from the government itself, often as an adjunct to foreign pol-
icy. Let us first examine a few of the various, and often powerful, calls 
for trade restraint as background to an understanding of the protectionist 
pressures themselves and the proper response to them. 
The Auto Industry: A Rocky Road 
In recent years, some of the most powerful calls for restraint of inter-
national trade have come from the American automobile industry, which 
earlier had been a bastion of free trade. This sentiment is rooted in the 
fact that sales of imported autos-especially those made in Japan-have 
captured large shares of our domestic market. The data tell a dramatic 
story: 
• In 1977, imported car sales constituted 18 percent of total U.S. 
domestic sales. By 1981, imports represented 27 percent of total 
U.S. auto sales, or 2.3 million cars. Last year, 80 percent of all 
imports-over 1.8 million autos-were made in Japan. 
• Sales of domestically made cars stood at a 20-year low in 1981, 
totaling 6.2 million units, down 5.7 percent from 1980. 
• Annual U.S. production of cars fell 32 percent between 1977 and 
1981. 1981 was the fourth straight year of output decline. 
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• The four domestic auto manufacturers incurred losses totaling $4.2 
billion in 1980 and $1.3 billion in 1981. 
• In February, 1982, of the 1.5 million members of the United Auto 
Workers (UAW), 250,000 were reported to be on indefinite layoff 
and more than 51,000 on temporary layoff. 
• 1 ,654 domestic car dealers-6.4 percent of the total-went out of 
business in 1980, three times the number of failures in 1975. 1 
Whatever the causes of problems facing U.S. automakers, the result is 
that this industry, which includes two of the six largest industrial corpo-
rations in America, has called for federal assistance. At times the com-
panies and the leading labor union (the United Auto Workers), together 
or separately, have supported and gained influential sponsors for pro-
posed laws that would limit the import of cars, particularly those from 
Japan. 
In 1981, considerable support developed for proposed legislation to 
establish firm quotas on imports of Japanese automobiles. In the face of 
that threat, Japan imposed a "voluntary" limit on its automobile exports 
to the United States for a period of two years. This unilateral "gentle-
men's agreement" was announced after a series of informal consultations 
between the United States and Japan. No similar restraints were sought 
on auto imports from other countries. 
As a result of Japan's voluntary restrictions and a weakening in the 
U.S. auto market, sales of Japanese cars in the U.S. in the first half of 
1982 declined by 12.6 percent. In adjusting to the restraints, Japanese 
automakers raised auto prices and began to export higher-priced autos. 
In any event, pressure for further protection has continued because of 
the large share of the U.S. market that Japanese imports still represent. 
Evidence that the Japanese are fully aware of this can be found in the 
fact that Tokyo agreed in late 1982-several months earlier than 
necessary-to extend its "voluntary" restriction on imported autos for a 
third year. The agreement, setting a ceiling of 1.68 million imports a 
year, was not due for extension until March 31, 1983.2 
One bill that has gained widespread support in Congress is the Fair 
Practices in Automotive Products Act (H.R. 5133 and S. 2300), which 
has more than 200 sponsors in the House of Representatives and 17 in 
the Senate. The bill would require automakers selling 500,000 or more 
cars annually in the U.S. to have 90 percent domestic (North American) 
parts and labor in their autos. Smaller requirements for domestic content 
would be imposed on producers selling fewer than 500,000 units a year, 
and those selling fewer than 100,000 cars (mainly European imports) 
would be exempt entirely. These restrictions would reach full force by 
1986. The primary proponents of this bill are the UAW and automobile 
parts suppliers. 
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The domestic content bill is described as a "jobs bill" through which 
the investment dollars now flowing overseas will be spent domestically. 
Its title suggests that someone has been engaged in "unfair practices" in 
building and marketing cars. However, only six foreign manufacturers 
sold more than 100,000 autos in the U.S. during 1980 and 1981, and all 
six were Japanese. Implicitly, foreign producers of high-priced luxury 
cars-which sell in relatively small numbers-are not viewed as engaged 
in unfair practices. Thus, the bill seems clearly directed at automobile 
imports from the larger producers in Japan. The major reason given for 
assuming that those companies have been "unfair" are data showing 
that, between 1978 and 1981, domestic sales of U.S.-made cars decreased 
33 percent, while sales of Japanese imports increased by 37 percent. 
Based on a host of considerations regarding costs, plant size, and parts 
procurement, the domestic content bill would actually discourage invest-
ment in the U.S. by reducing foreign manufacturers' capabilities to use 
worldwide sources for components. Consequently, reduced investment-
coupled with the resulting lower sales of imported cars-would limit 
domestic competition and have corollary effects on productivity in the 
auto industry. The law would also reduce the international competitive-
ness of domestic U.S. automakers (i.e., in following a "world car" 
The udomestic content,, bill for autos 
would actually discourage rather than increase 
investment in the U.S. 
strategy), since worldwide sourcing for parts permits efficient and cost-
effective production. Bookkeeping required for compliance would be 
massive, since detailed reports on parts supplied would be needed. 
Profits for American automakers and parts suppliers would rise, but 
gains in this area would be offset by decreased competition in both 
domestic and international markets. 
The U.S. Department of Commerce has estimated that, should the bill 
become law, auto prices in the United States would rise by 10 percent or 
more. A 1980 study by the Council of Economic Advisers reported that 
limiting imports to 10 percent of the U.S. market would raise car prices 
between 13 and 17 percent. Other studies by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and the American International Automobile Dealers Association 
predict even greater price hikes, ranging between $500 and $3,000 more 
per car. Presumably, higher prices would further reduce the already weak 
demand for new motor vehicles. 
The ratio of added consumer cost to jobs-generated has been estimated 
at four to one. The Reagan Administration has predicted that every new 
job generated in the auto industry would cost the U.S. economy 
$100,000 a year.3 
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Steel Imports: Trigger Prices and "Dumping" 
The concern of the American steel industry over steel imports, primar-
ily from the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan, predates 
that of Detroit over imported autos. Steel produced in other parts of the 
industrialized world has been sold in the U.S. in substantial quantities 
for more than two decades. For example, this country's net steel trade 
balance shifted from positive to negative as early as 1959, and imports 
have been on the rise since then. In 1981 steel imports comprised 16 per-
cent of the U.S. market.4 
This penetration of imports has, from time to time, prompted domes-
tic steel producers to level charges that importers were "dumping," or 
selling steel at "less than fair value," defined as the price that the pro-
ducer charges in its home market. U.S. law provides for anti-dumping 
duties to be levied on imports if the sale of dumped goods causes "mate-
rial harm" to a domestic industry. Also, countervailing duties can be 
imposed to offset subsidies by foreign governments if subsidized imports 
cause harm. A major action to stem the flow of steel imports was taken 
in 1969, when Japan and the EEC were forced into a "voluntary restric-
tion agreement" (VRA) for three years. This limitation of imports was 
aimed largely at European steelmakers that had made large inroads in the 
U.S. market. The current sentiment for protecting the steel industry, 
however, surfaced in 1977, when growing imports spurred domestic pro-
ducers and labor unions to launch an intensive lobbying campaign in 
Washington. U.S. steelmakers also filed 19 separate antidumping suits. 
Thus, a strong political and legal offensive forced the Carter Administra-
tion to take a variety of specialized actions. 
The trigger price mechanism (TPM) for steel was put in place early in 
1978. This device established "reference prices" for steel imports based 
on Japanese production costs. When imports fell below these prices, a 
dumping investigation would automatically be "triggered." The demise of 
this protectionist mechanism began in 1981, when imports rose substan-
tially over those of 1980. In that year, EEC producers, for instance, 
increased their tonnage of steel sold in the U.S. by 63 percent and 
domestic producers began to register complaints about dumping and 
subsidies. 
Robert Crandall of the Brookings Institution has found that the TPM 
raised imported steel prices in 1979 by 10 percent, and domestic steel 
prices by about 1 percent. The total effect was to raise steel prices in the 
United States by about 2.4 percent (because imports were 16 percent of 
the domestic market). It is ironic to note that a major customer of the 
U.S. steel industry is the hard-pressed automobile industry, which bears 
the higher costs that result from protection. Crandall has estimated the 
total cost to the American consumer of the TPM at about $1 billion in 
1979. He added, however, that the mechanism was probably the lesser of 
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two evils, since "trigger prices moderated the potentially inflationary 
effects that the full prosecution of dumping suits might have produced."5 
The TPM was suspended in January, 1982, when seven major U.S. 
steelmakers filed a total of 132 cases of dumping with the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission, aimed at firms in eleven European countries. 
In June 1982, the Commission proposed countervailing duties, ranging 
from 18 to 40 percent, on various EEC steel companies that were found 
to be subsidized by their governments. (In October 1982, the Commis-
sion ruled that the subsidized steel had injured our domestic steel indus-
tries. This action was a necessary step for the imposition of the duties.) 
In an effort to halt the duties, European governments agreed in 
August of 1982 to quotas on 11 types of steel imports. This agreement 
was rejected, however, by U.S. steel producers, who refused to withdraw 
their countervailing duty petitions. Later, the Commerce Department also 
issued a preliminary antidumping ruling against various steel imports 
from the EEC. 
Quotas established by Western European 
steel producers in response to U.S. pressures 
are a type of cartel 
In October 1982, European governments agreed to quotas that would 
keep their steel imports to about 5 percent of the U.S. market and also 
added several types of steel to those governed by the previous quotas 
negotiated in August. That agreement was widely heralded in the United 
States, especially by the federal government and the steel industry. The 
companies then withdrew their original complaints, which were the basis 
for the countervailing duties. 
On reflection, the results may not be so sanguine. The quotas which 
Western European producers are now establishing in response to U.S. 
pressures mean, in effect, that we have forced them to establish a type of 
cartel or market-sharing arrangement. Countervailing duties are a special 
form of tariff. They work through the price mechanism and deal with 
the problem of "unfair" (i.e., subsidized) competition. But quotas 
restrict "fair" and "unfair" competition alike. Thus, it would have been 
preferable for the U.S. government to have imposed countervailing 
duties to offset European steel subsidies rather than to absolutely reduce 
the flow of steel imports. 
Moreover, the European Economic Community has indicated that its 
member nations would reduce their steel imports from countries such as 
Taiwan, Brazil and South Korea. This response to their agreement to 
limit Western European steel exports to the United States means that we 
can expect an increased volume of imports to the United States from 
non-European steel producers, none of whom are parties to the recent 
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market-sharing agreement. There are already rumblings about instituting 
steel-dumping charges against Japan and some of the developing coun-
tries. Thus, the United States may not be at the end of the road in terms 
of "protection" of our domestic steel markets. 
Extension of the Multifiber Arrangement 
means that governments will continue to make 
key decisions on the flow of textile products 
The Problem of American Textiles 
Pressures against free trade in the textile industry in America have been 
strong for many years. In the mid-1950s the U.S. found it necessary to 
negotiate a five-year program to restrain Japanese exports of clothing. 
Other labor-intensive economies with large forces of low-wage, semi-
skilled workers-including those of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South 
Korea-continued to export so many textile goods to the United States in 
the 1960s and 1970s that further restraints were imposed. These included 
a Long-Term Arrangement (LTA) in 1962. This agreement was not 
entirely successful, since imports of cotton products, for example, 
increased from 5.2 percent of domestic consumption in 1961 to 14.3 
percent in 1973.6 
Economic factors in the domestic textile industry have an important 
bearing on recurrent demands for protection. In the face of moderately 
rising consumer purchases, domestic output of apparel and textile mill 
products has declined over the past decade or so. Apparel imports, in 
particular, have captured large shares of the domestic market and now 
comprise roughly one fourth of the total. In constant, inflation-adjusted 
dollars, the value of clothing imports to the U.S. increased from roughly 
$1 billion in 1969 to well over $3.5 billion in 1979, or 256 percent (in real 
terms). Not too surprisingly, the number of firms manufacturing apparel 
and textile mill products in the United States has steadily declined during 
the same period, falling by almost one third between 1969 and 1976. 
Small textile firms (those with less than $100,000 in assets) have been 
hardest hit, decreasing in number by one half over the seven-year period. 
U.S. trade in clothing and textile products is currently controlled by 
the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) of 1973. Under extensions, the agree-
ment will remain in effect through July, 1986, and now covers a wider 
variety of products than the previous LTA. The MFA allows most catego-
ries of apparel imports to grow at a minimum 6 percent annual rate, 
regardless of the growth rate of domestic purchases of clothing and tex-
tiles. However, the agreement also contains "flexibility provisions" that 
permit wide fluctuations in import volume. All in all, the recent exten-
sion of the MFA means that governments will continue to make key deci-
sions as to the flows of textile products among the major producing and 
8 
consuming economies and, specifically, that textile imports into the 
United States will continue to be limited by government action. 
Footwear Quotas and "Voluntary" Export Restraints 
"Voluntary" export quotas, also known as Orderly Marketing Agree-
ments (OMAs), had been imposed on footwear imports to the U.S. 
throughout the 1970s until 1981, when the Reagan Administration 
refused to extend them. In general, these import restraints have been 
severely criticized for two reasons. First, the cost to American consumers 
is high relative to any benefits to American producers and workers. Sec-
ond, the "voluntary" nature of the quotas has meant that large quota 
profits have gone to foreign producers rather than to American con-
sumers or taxpayers (as when the quota "rights" are distributed domesti-
cally in the U.S.). A recent study examining Korean footwear quotas in 
particular, however, has shown that several other factors exist that make 
the OMAs even less desirable than has traditionally been believed. 
Footwear quotas acted as a uregressive" tax 
whereby low-income consumers 
were more adversely affected than 
high-income consumers 
Voluntary footwear quotas can impose significant economic damage on 
producers in the exporting country itself. In the case of Korea, firms 
that had less political power were discriminated against in the quota allo-
cation process and were particularly hurt-although even the large firms 
that were favored in the process fared poorly under the voluntary 
arrangements. More important to the American consumer, however, is 
the fact that footwear quotas acted as a "regressive" tax whereby low-
income individuals were more adversely affected than high-income con-
sumers. 
Since footwear is a necessity, the OMAs were considerably more 
regressive than an outright tariff on these goods for two reasons. First, 
the quotas increased the price of each pair of imported shoes from 
Korea, resulting in larger percentage increases for the low-priced foot-
wear that is generally purchased by lower income groups. Second, the 
quotas induced an increase in the relative supply of higher-quality foot-
wear (which is higher in price), thereby resulting in lower price increases 
for those shoes that are generally purchased by higher-income groups. In 
this sense, the voluntary restraints on footwear acted as a regressive 
"tax" on low-income consumers. In fact, data show that the implicit tax 
imposed by footwear quotas on the lowest income group (under $7,000 
annually) is about three times higher than that imposed on the highest 
income group ($25,000 and higher).7 
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Thus, there is strong reason to believe that the effects seen in the case 
of "voluntary" quotas on Korean footwear-significant damage to for-
eign producers and an inequitable burden imposed on U.S. consumers-
will also be seen in the voluntary restraints recently imposed on Japanese 
auto imports, discussed earlier. 
Sugar Import Quotas: Price Sweeteners 
Actions designed to protect the domestic sugar industry in the United 
States present significant obstacles to world trade for many reasons. Fun-
damentally, this industry is heavily subsidized by the Federal Government 
through its farm price support and loan programs. 
A world glut of sugar in 1981 forced the world-market price down to 
roughly nine cents a pound, well below the level of 20 cents a pound in 
the U.S., which is determined largely through federal price supports. 
Should the domestic prices drop sharply, the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture would eventually be forced to to take possession of unsold sugar 
posted as collateral for nonrecourse loans at the subsidized price. Under 
the support program, farmers could avoid repaying the loans by forfeit 
of the sugar. The USDA would have to store the surplus at an estimated 
cost of $200 million a year. To avoid this result, President Reagan im-
posed quotas on imported sugar in May, 1982.8 
The immediate result of those quotas is to raise sugar prices for major 
industrial users in the U.S. by about 4 cents a pound. It has been esti-
mated that an increase of one cent adds more than $224 million to the 
annual costs of the major industrial users. This cost, of course, is passed 
on to consumers-probably with the normal markup-when they pur-
chase manufactured products containing sugar. By one estimate, the 
overall program of supports and quotas for sugar will cost American 
consumers $3 billion a year. 
The Soviet Gas Pipeline 
Another recent impediment to free world trade was the economic sanc-
tions unilaterally imposed by the United States on companies supplying 
materials to the Soviet Union for building the trans-Siberia natural gas 
pipeline to Western Europe. Since 1978, the U.S. has exercised some 
degree of control over exports to the USSR of equipment and technology 
for oil and gas exploration and production. In 1981, however, because of 
Soviet involvement in the imposition of martial law in Poland, these con-
trols were broadened to include equipment and technology for the trans-
mission and refinement of both natural gas and oil. 
In June 1982, President Reagan expanded these sanctions to include 
equipment and technology of foreign origin that is exported by U.S.-
owned or controlled firms, and products based on American technology 
that are sold through licensing or royalty agreements.9 After much com-
plaint from our allies in Western Europe, President Reagan announced 
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the termination of the pipeline embargo in November 1982. The ban on 
licensing of equipment for exploration of oil and natural gas was 
adjusted to allow for licenses to be issued on a case-by-case basis. The 
November liberalization actions, taken after detailed discussion with our 
Western European allies, are designed to avoid future trade arrangements 
that might contribute to "the strategic advantage" of the USSR. In his 
announcement, the President indicated that "priority attention" would be 
given to trade in high-technology products and that no new contracts for 
the purchase of Soviet natural gas would be made by our trading part-
ners, pending a study of alternative energy sources. Thus, direct or indi-
rect controls over trade with the Soviet Union continue, albeit on a more 
multilateral basis. 
From the viewpoint of foreign policy, such use of our economic power 
has many attractions over conventional responses in terms of military 
strength. Yet the economic repercussions are worthy of attention. Critics 
have pointed out that President Carter's partial embargo on grain 
exports to the USSR in 1979 was ineffective and cost American farmers a 
great deal, since other nations increased their grain sales to the Soviets. 
Also, the unilateral imposition of the pipeline embargo by the United 
States created serious tensions in this country's relationships with its 
NATO allies, and the possibility remains of other such uses of economic 
instruments in the future. 
Unilateral imposition of the Soviet pipeline 
embargo by the U.S. created serious tensions 
in our relationships with NATO allies 
The paperwork burden of the pipeline embargo was substantial. For 
example, the Department of Commerce asked 39 companies each to pro-
vide a general description of the technology specially designed for use in 
exploration, production, transmission, and refining which the company 
(or any subsidiary) has transferred during the past seven years to all loca-
tions outside the United States. The data requested include the date of 
each transfer and the name and address of the transferee. In addition, 
the companies were asked for a description of the products or technology 
which the company or any subsidiaries have supplied or plan to supply 
for the purpose of constructing the Siberian pipeline. 1° Certainly, infor-
mational requests of this nature do little to encourage the future flow of 
technology across national boundaries. 
Demands for "Reciprocity" 
The five areas of trade just examined do not exhaust the pressures for 
erecting barriers to the free flow of trade. In a more general approach, 
further demands have been voiced by many industries for a new and spe-
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cial type of "reciprocity" -erecting import barriers to the goods of for-
eign nations that close or restrict their markets to imports from the 
United States. Such actions, it is suggested, should be directed at nations 
that do not "reciprocate" in world trade as fully as does the U.S., partic-
ularly Japan, Western Europe, and Canada. u 
In the customary usage of the term, reciprocity has had a more posi-
tive connotation. It traditionally has been viewed as a matter of promot-
ing "equivalent" trade opportunities in other countries, rather than as a 
device to force trade concessions on a quid pro quo basis or to obtain 
strict "equality" of markets worldwide. In this older sense, the term has 
normally been equated with "unconditional most-favored nation status" 
(MFN), under which the granting of privileges and the reduction of tar-
iffs for one country must apply to all eligible countries. 
The current sentiments for reciprocity are different, however, in that 
they involve both protectionism and retaliation against countries with less 
open trading policies. The new concept's main assumptions are that many 
nations have not offered trade and investment opportunities as freely as 
the U.S., and that existing means of trade enforcement are not strong 
enough to correct the imbalance. Under the newer approach, unilateral 
action and enforcement on the part of the U.S. would be stressed, rather 
than bilateral or multilateral agreements. Thus, the proposals for reci-
procity legislation would mean closing American markets to those 
nations that do not grant U.S. firms equivalent access to their markets. 
Congress has been pressured from many quarters to enact this form of 
reciprocity. In early 1982, the Reciprocal Trade and Investment Act 
(S. 2094) was introduced in the Senate, sponsored by Sen. John Dan-
forth (R-Mo.) and 11 others. It would require the government to measure 
the impact of foreign, nontariff trade barriers on the United States. The 
President would then be able to put in place American counteractions if 
the barriers of another country are not removed. This reciprocity bill was 
not reported out of a conference committee in the 97th Congress, 
although it was attached to a tariff bill (H.R. 4566) passed by the House 
of Representatives. Consideration of the measure was blocked in the Sen-
ate by Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-Oh.), one of the sponsors of the 
bill, and by Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), who acted on behalf of the 
United Auto Workers and the AFL-CIO in attempting to attach to the 
legislation domestic content provisions for automobiles. 
Protectionist sentiment in the United States 
seems to be stronger now 
than it has been in decades 
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The Current Outlook 
Protectionist sentiment in the United States appears to be stronger now 
than it has been in decades. Furthermore, the threats to free trade seem 
to be rapidly multiplying, with a growing array of industrial sectors 
requesting special, protective measures from the government. 
For example, in the Fall of 1982 a bill was pending in the House of 
Representatives that would suspend new foreign contracts for imports of 
uranium when imports exceeded 37.5 percent of total domestic demand 
over a two-year period. The proposed law is intended to forestall the 
large increase in market share that foreign producers of uranium are pro-
jected to obtain by 1990, and to bring relief to a domestic industry now 
facing slackened demand (especially from electric utilities). 12 
Improved relations with China have also brought about new pressures 
for protection from the effects of free trade with that country. In late 
1982 the U.S. mushroom ind~stry petitioned the Reagan Administration 
to impose an annual quota of 21 million pounds on canned mushrooms 
imported from mainland China. Nearly half of the import market in 
mushrooms was held by China in the first two quarters of 1982. U.S. 
producers of other goods, including makers of ceramic tableware, 
mechanics' shop towels, and undyed textile goods, have charged the Chi-
nese with unfair pricing and unduly large market penetration. The U.S. 
textile industry has also become extremely concerned that China, cur-
rently the fourth-largest exporter of textiles to the U.S., may soon cap-
ture even larger market shares. In addition, other Chinese exports such 
as steel nails, manhole covers, refined gasoline, and certain tungsten 
products may soon undergo investigation. 13 
The U.S. trade deficit with Japan 
has been more than offset by 
our trade surplus with Western Europe 
In a diverse world economy, virtually all sectors of American business 
are apt to find some appeal, at least in the short term, for protective 
measures. The following sections of this report will present an alternative 
view of protectionism and suggest why trade policy proposals need to be 
examined in the broader light of consumer and national welfare. The 
reader's appetite may be whetted by noting that, over the past decade, 
the highly publicized U.S. trade deficit with Japan has been more than 
offset by our trade surplus with Western Europe. Since 1979, the U.S. 
trade surplus with the two areas combined has totaled over $7 billion, as 
shown in both Table 1 and in Figures lA and lB. 
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TABLE 1 
Comparison of U.S. Trade with Japan and Western Europe 
(billions of dollars) 
Area 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 19811982(1)* 
Japan 
Exports 8.4 10.7 9.6 10.2 10.6 13.0 17.6 20.8 21.8 5.1 
Imports ----.!l.:]_~____!l_d~~~~~~ 10.2 
Deficits -1.3-1.7-1.7-5.3-8.0-11.6-8.6-10.4-15.8-5.0 
Western Europe 
Exports 21.2 28.1 29.9 31.9 34.1 39.6 54.2 67.6 65.1 15.2 
Imports ~ 24.3 20.8~~~____1!&____1Zd___2b2 12.6 
Surplus +1.4 +3.9 +9.1 +8.9 +5.9 +2.9+12.4+20.3+12.2+2.6 
Net 
surplus ( +) 
or 
deficit (-) +.1 +2.2 +7.4 +3.5 -2.1 -8.7 +3.7 +9.9 -3.6-2.4 
*First quarter data only. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, June 1982, 
p. 48. All figures are rounded. 
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II. Foreign Obstacles to U.S. Exports 
Foreign countries create a wide range of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
to U.S. products and services. Table 2 illustrates some of the impedi-
ments maintained by our major trading partners in Japan, Canada, and 
Western Europe. 1 By focusing on informal practices as well as formal 
tariff and quota barriers, we can get a good idea of the practical difficul-
ties facing a U.S. firm trying to enter or expand its position in foreign 
markets. 
Quotas on Imports 
The first category of restraint is quotas, or restrictions on the quantity 
of foreign imports. For example, each of the six countries in Table 2 has 
quotas on foreign films and television programs. Other quotas apply to 
technical services, such as law practice and data processing personnel, as 
well as to products. Product quotas are both numerous and complicated, 
so we will use Japan as an example. 
Japan currently maintains 27 separate product restrictions that have 
been illegal since 1963, according to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), because they can no longer be justified on the basis 
of a trade balance deficit. At the time of this writing, talks are being 
conducted between Japan and the U.S. to attempt to liberalize or remove 
these restrictions, but at the present time Japan maintains quantitative 
import restrictions on: meat of bovine animals; milk and cream; proc-
essed cheese; meat of pigs; shore fish and cod roe; scallops, squid, shell-
fish, edible seaweeds; citrus fruits; pineapples; fruit juices; tomato juices, 
ketchup or sauce; starch and insulin; grape sugar; various types of flour, 
including wheat, rice and groats; beans, peas, peanuts; coal; and many 
leather products. 
Tariffs on Imports 
Table 2 also displays tariffs, including both formal customs charges 
and practices which have the same effect. For instance, Japan has 
explicit tariff quotas on corn and soybeans for industrial use, and 
implicit tariffs embodied in the practice of rebating "cargo taxes" and 
taxes on air fares to travellers who use the national air carrier. The same 
pattern is followed at times in other countries: Germany, along with the 
rest of the European Community, has variable levies on wheat, barley, 
oats, sorghum, rye and rice, along with explicit tariffs on data processing 
software and a variety of footwear. 2 But certain practices, such as dis-
criminatory tax treatment of foreign firms, reserve asset requirements or 
reinsurance laws that do not apply to domestic firms, have very much 
the same effect as an explicit tariff. The U.K. maintains tariffs on data 
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TABLE 2 Foreign Barriers to U.S. Exports-Examples for Six Nations 
Type of West United 
Restriction Japan Canada Germany Kingdom France Italy 
QUOTAS Foreign films Foreign law firms Foreign banks Certain work Foreign insurance Foreign films 
Hiring of foreign Foreign films Foreign films permits companies 
personnel TV programs Foreign data Foreign law firms Foreign law firms 
Licensing of Foreign data processing Foreign films Foreign films 
foreign data processing personnel Licensing of 
processing personnel foreign data 
firms processing 
27 product firms 
categories 
SELECTIVE Air cargo and air Insurance appli- Microfilming and Data communica- Automated 
TARIFFS fares cations for certain tions hardware reservation 
Tariff quota on operation and publications Air cargo and air equipment 
some types of reinsurance Data communica- fares Air cargo, air fares 
-
corn imports Data processing tions hardware Forms of tax Air landing fees and 
00 Soybeans software Forms of tax treatment for import duties 
Most grains treatment for certain firms Taxation of foreign firms 
certain firms Most grains Most grains 
Most grains 
BUY DOMESTIC Informal prefer- Data processing Limitations on Limitations on Limitations on Prohibition of 
RESTRICTIONS ences for services foreign law foreign foreign foreign TV 
domestic tele- Consulting firms, accounting insurance commercials 
communications, engineers accountants, firms firms; Limitations on 
freight firms Insurance on and bank government foreign 
Government government personnel insurance insurance 
insurance projects must Informal domes- placed with firms 
placed through be bought tic "monopoly" domestic firms 
domestic firms domestically of insurance 
Steel subsidy of Telecommunications 
domestic Preferences for 
production domestic airlines 
TABLE 2 (Continued) Foreign Barriers to U.S. Exports-Examples for Six Nations 
Type of West United 
Restriction Japan Canada Germany Kingdom France Italy 
EXPORT/PATENT Lack of protection No protection for No protection for No protection for Lack of protection 
RESTRICTIONS on copyrights, foreign data foreign soft- foreign for foreign 
patents processing ware and tele- data-processing software 
services communications software 
DOMESTIC Limitations on Limitations on Limitations on Limitations on Limitations on Limitations on 
REGULATORY franchises of foreign foreign foreign foreign franchises of 
foreign firms insurance insurance insurance insurance foreign firms 
Regulation of firms firms firms firms 
- foreign insur-1.0 
ance firms 
Restrictions on 
foreign law 
firms 
Nationalized grain 
markets 
BANKING & Infrequent permis- Personnel All bank Equity restrictions Limit on number Currency control 
FINANCIAL sion for foreign restrictions information on foreign of foreign and exchange 
SERVICES branches Limited foreign processing banks, other directors requirements 
No foreign retail equity must be restrictions Lengthy 
banking participation domestic including procedures for 
No foreign bank discriminatory establishing 
export reserve foreign 
rediscounting requirements branches 
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communications hardware, as does France. France and Italy rebate cargo 
taxes and air fare taxes if the traveller uses the national air carrier, and 
Italy has tariffs on a variety of telecommunications hardware, including 
25 percent on automated reservation equipment (interestingly, domestic 
Italian equipment does not meet the requirements of American air 
carriers). 
Buy Domestic Restrictions 
The third column in Table 2 illustrates, but by no means exhausts, 
some of the "Buy Domestic" requirements and practices of these six 
nations. Most of our international trading partners use their own air-
lines, place insurance for government projects only with domestic firms, 
and use only domestic computer capacity for data processing needs, 
whether by law or "understanding." There are also many product-specific 
requirements: Italy allows no foreign-produced television commercials, 
Germany (informally) allows no foreign insurance companies and no for-
eign banks, other than representative offices. Japan subsidizes steel pro-
duction, which has the effect of raising the relative price of foreign-
produced steel products, so that very little foreign steel is imported. 
Other Regulatory Barriers to Imports 
Laws in other countries regulating franchising, patents, and copyrights 
are often indifferently enforced, and the laws themselves differ widely, 
making international operation of a patented process or product line 
both very complicated and in danger of outright pirating. This is a grow-
ing problem in the protection of copyrights on telecommunications and 
data processing software-products that may be quite expensive for a 
U.S. firm to develop and very difficult to protect in another country. 
Most countries maintain regulatory restrictions on franchising of foreign 
firms, whether it be technical, professional services, banking, or con-
sumer services such as restaurants or retail stores. The fact that regula-
tions are vague, vary widely, and are often subject to interpretation by 
local bureaucracy makes entry by foreign firms both expensive and time-
consuming. 
In Italy, local objection to franchising a foreign firm can effectively 
block an application indefinitely, even if the objection comes only from 
potential competitors. Franchising, or almost any type of application, 
can be a very expensive proposition for U.S. companies operating in 
other countries. U.S. firms abroad often face a dilemma, torn between 
local bureaucratic practice which requires payment of "fees" at several 
points in the application process, and U.S. laws prohibiting bribery. 
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Barriers to Financial Services 
The next general category, banking and financial services, is one of the 
most heavily restricted. Differential access to domestic rediscounting, dis-
criminatory tax treatment and reserve requirements, outright prohibition 
of retail banking, and restrictions on foreign ownership, all make it diffi-
cult for U.S. banks to compete with local banks. Several countries have 
personnel quotas, and Germany requires that bank directors be German 
nationals, with at least three years' banking experience in Germany. 
Transportation and Distribution Services 
There are several types of restrictions on U.S. firms that offer trans-
portation services in other countries. Among the explicit barriers ate reg-
ulations on types of containers which may be imported (Japan, France, 
Italy), quotas for the minimum proportion of cargo that must be carried 
on domestic flag vessels, lengthy petition requirements for price increases 
in auto/truck leasing, and bonding requirements which apply only to for-
eign firms. More important, however, are informal restrictive practices. 
Most countries subsidize the domestic national air carrier, either directly 
or by differential access to ground handling facilities, terminal space, or 
automated reservation equipment. An interesting informal practice, most 
prevalent in Germany, Italy and Japan, is the fact that international trav-
elers find it very difficult to make domestic connecting reservations on 
the national carrier unless the international portion of their flight is also 
booked on the national carrier; baggage handling is much slower for for-
eign carriers, and terminal facilities are often cramped or inconvenient. 
Another aspect of foreign barriers is internal distribution systems. 
Japan's "kieretsu" distribution system gives preference to local products. 
No practical way exists to by-pass this highly traditional way of doing 
business. Informal vertical integration, in the form of long-term business 
"relationships" (perhaps several generations old), tend to effectively deny 
U.S. firms access to retail markets. For example, U.S. tobacco products 
are priced higher, given inferior marketing and display, and often ignored 
under the kieretsu system. The most difficult characteristic of this type 
of barrier is the fact that change is almost impossible to negotiate; as far 
as Japan's government is concerned, no trade barrier exists, and entry is 
free. This provides little comfort to the U.S. firm attempting to obtain 
competitive retail distribution. The problem also extends to the awarding 
of competitive bids. Technically, any company can submit a bid; in real-
ity, the contract is given to the traditional domestic supplier. Nippon Tele-
graph and Telephone Public Corporation (NTT) recently submitted a 
request for bids, open to foreign countries, for a "modem" used in data 
communications. However, "rather than just outlining functional charac-
teristics, U.S. executives claim, NTT specifies physical features right 
down to the location of ventilation holes -details almost identical to 
those of Nippon Electric Company's modem." 3 
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In the face of increasing competition for international markets, infor-
mal barriers of this sort may become more widespread as other countries 
learn how effective they can be. For example, France recently announced 
a distribution policy that has effects similar to Japan's system. All 
imported video recorders must be cleared through customs at Poitiers, a 
city distant from the main transportation routes with a customs staff of 
only four and with no computerized facilities for handling the compli-
cated paper work required for clearance. 4 
All video recorders imported to France 
must be cleared through customs at Poitiers, 
a city distant from transportation routes, 
having a customs staff of only four 
Miscellaneous Barriers to Trade 
In the final section of Table 2 are a number of miscellaneous restric-
tions. Most are preferential tax treatment of domestic firms or outright 
subsidies for domestic production. For example, Italy and France provide 
direct financial support of a variety of domestic industries, while Canada 
restricts foreign-produced services such as advertising. 
Weak Yen and Strong Dollar 
An important factor affecting U.S. exports to other countries is the 
strength of the U.S. dollar vis-a-vis foreign currencies, especially the yen. 
This barrier is neither formal nor, perhaps, intentional. But if a foreign 
central bank allows its currency to depreciate against the currencies of its 
trading partners, imports into that country are more expensive and 
export prices fall. For example, between 1978 and the third quarter of 
1982, the yen fell from 190.52 to the dollar to 276.30 to the dollar, rais-
ing the price of U.S. exports there and reducing the price of Japanese 
imports in the U.S. about 31 percent. It is difficult to tell if this is solely 
a response to market forces. As might be said, "while Japan may not be 
actively depressing the yen's value, it is doing much less than it could to 
strengthen the currency.''s 
Our discussion of foreign restrictions on U.S. products is intended to 
be only illustrative. Nonetheless, we have shown foreign barriers to be 
both pervasive and damaging. In the growing export of services, as well 
as the more traditional industrial and consumer products, foreign barri-
ers sharply reduce the ability of American companies to compete for 
sales abroad. 
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Ill. U.S. Obstacles to International Trade 
As we have just seen, there are a great many diverse foreign obstacles 
to U.S. exports. In a general way, the American public is aware of the 
fact that many countries make it difficult for United States companies to 
export the goods and services that they produce. However, what is rarely 
appreciated is the fact that the United States itself does not maintain a 
posture of pure free trade. That is, our government imposes numerous 
obstacles on imports from other countries. Moreover, our government 
also restricts various types of exports from the United States. 
Thus, any balanced and comprehensive treatment of international 
trade policy must take into account both shortcomings in foreign treat-
ment of international trade, as well as shortcomings on the part of our 
own country. Four major types of trade obstacles inhibit imports into the 
United States: 
1. "Buy American" statutes which give preference to domestic pro-
ducers in procurement by federal, state, and local governments. 
2. The Jones Act, which prohibits foreign ships from engaging in 
waterborne commerce between U.S. ports. 
3. A variety of agricultural and other statutes which limit the import 
of specific products. 
4. Selective high tariffs on specific items. 
In addition, two major types of domestic U.S. policy actions reduce 
the ability of American firms to compete both at home and abroad: 
1. A variety of domestic regulatory activities, which impose burdens 
on domestic production not borne by foreign producers. 
2. Export controls, which restrict certain types of exports on national 
security or foreign policy grounds or for domestic political 
reasons. 
Any balanced treatment of international trade 
must take into account both shortcomings in 
foreign treatment of trade, as well as 
shortcomings on our own part 
"Buy American" and Merchant Marine Statutes 
"Buy American" provisions have been enacted by many governmental 
units. 1 The Federal Buy American Act of 1933 requires federal agencies 
purchasing commodities for use within the United States to pay up to a 6 
percent differential for domestically produced goods. As much as a 50 
percent differential is paid for military goods produced at home. In addi-
tion, the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1978 requires that, for 
purchases over $500,000, American materials and products be used, 
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unless the Secretary of Transportation makes some statutory exceptions. 
Also, American flag vessels must be used to transport at least 50 percent 
of the gross tonnage of all commodities financed with U.S. foreign aid 
funds (see Table 3). 
The Buy American laws of the states are varied. New York requires 
state agencies to buy American steel. New Jersey requires that all state 
cars must be domestically produced. Arizona applies preference to other 
states with "Buy State" laws, if the product is not available in Arizona. 
In addition, numerous states and municipal authorities require use of 
American materials in privately owned as well and publicly-owned 
utilities. 
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 (the "Jones Act") requires that all 
ocean-going shipments from one point in the United States to another be 
transported in U.S. flag vessels. This law, of course, effectively bars all 
competition in U.S. domestic marine transport. Moreover, the perverse 
effects of such cabotage laws are greater than might be expected. For 
example, at times, Canadian lumber transported in Japanese flag vessels 
could undersell domestic timber from Oregon in the lucrative Southern 
California markets. In such cases, both the American merchant marine 
and the American timber industry suffer damage. Foreigners then 
become the unintended beneficiaries of these attempts to subsidize the 
American merchant marine. 
Import Restrictions on Agricultural and Other Goods 
Numerous federal statutes restrict the import of specific products. For 
example, section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935 permits 
the President to regulate the imports of agricultural products if such 
imports materially interfere with price support programs operated by the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Section 22 quotas are currently 
employed to limit imports of dairy products, peanuts, cotton, and cotton 
products. 
Restrictions on sugar imports cost 
American consumers over $1.5 billion a year 
As described in Section I, in order to maintain the domestic sugar 
price at the level mandated by the Agricultural and Food Act of 1981, 
sugar import fees are levied and quotas are being imposed. In 1980, the 
staff of the Federal Trade Commission estimated that the restrictions on 
sugar imports were costing American consumers over $1.5 billion a year. 2 
Under the Meat Import Act of 1979, the President has authority to 
impose beef import quotas if imports of beef reach a certain trigger 
level. In practice, the U.S. generally has encouraged foreign exporters to 
restrain their sales voluntarily to avoid the imposition of formal quotas. 
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TABLE 3 
State 
Buy-American Practices Imposed by the States 
Practice 
Alabama 
California 
Georgia 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
New Jersey 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Dakota 
Oklahoma 
Pennsylvania 
South Dakota 
Wyoming 
Requires use of U.S. materials "if available at reason-
able prices" in cases of public works financed by state 
funds. 
Requires use of materials of U.S. origin (subject to 
court challenge). 
Requires state agencies to buy American products if 
price and quality are equal. 
Establishes a scale of preferences for domestic prod-
ucts. 
Requires state bids to carry a clause restricting use of 
foreign materials. 
Restricts use of foreign steel and aluminum. 
Discourages state agencies from requesting foreign-
made products. 
Reserves the right to reject bids involving foreign prod-
ucts when in direct competition with American prod-
ucts. 
Gr~nts preference, "other considerations being equal," 
to m-state products first and then to other American 
products. 
Requires U.S. domestic materials to be used unless 
their cost is "unreasonable." 
Restricts use of foreign products through general speci-
fications for bids. 
Follows a policy of purchasing domestic products 
"wherever we deem we are not penalizing ourselves as 
to competition, availability, service and ultimate cost." 
Requires certain bids to carry the phrase "bid domesti-
cally produced material only." 
Requires purchases of domestic goods and equipment 
unless a foreign product is of "equal quality" and also 
"substantially cheaper" or is of "substantially superior 
quality" and is sold at a "comparable price to domestic 
products." 
Prevents use in state projects of foreign steel and alu-
minum products made in countries that "discriminate" 
against American products. 
Writes state specifications for American-made prod-
ucts; if foreign-made is bid, award is made on condi-
tion of acceptance by the state agency. 
Generally discourages use of foreign goods. 
Source: Norman S. Fieleke, "The Buy-American Policy of the United States 
Government," New England Economic Review, July-August 1969. 
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Section 8e of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 speci-
fies that if certain grade, size, quality or maturity standards are 
employed in a marketing order for a commodity (restricting domestic 
supplies), then the same or comparable requirements apply to imports of 
that commodity. These nontariff barriers apply to 16 crops: 
Tomatoes Green Peppers Walnuts 
Avocados Irish Potatoes Dates 
Mangoes Cucumbers Raisins 
Limes Oranges Prunes 
Grapefruit Onions Filberts 
Egg Plant 
In addition, several so-called Orderly Marketing Agreements (OMAs) 
were negotiated in the 1970s whereby other countries agreed to restrict 
their exports to the United States. The practical effect, of course, is simi-
lar to that of a quota imposed on our imports. Such OMAs have covered 
non-rubber footwear and color TVs. The current voluntary restraint pro-
gram governing the export by Japan of cars to the United States is a 
close cousin. 
As pointed out earlier, a more elaborate set of import restraints exists 
in the textile area. In that case, the United States has entered into a series 
of interrelated bilateral agreements with the major textile exporters and 
importers to restrict the import of textiles to and from various nations. 
The FTC staff study estimated the cost of these restrictions to the Ameri-
can consumer at nearly $6.0 billion a year. 3 
In addition, the long-standing escape clause of the Trade Act of 1974 
and its predecessor statutes provides for temporary "relief" from low 
U.S. tariffs in the case of industries that show serious injury, or threat of 
that condition, from imports.4 
The cost of textile restrictions to the 
American consumer total nearly $6.0 billion annually 
Selective High Tariffs 
Despite low average duties (3.1 percent), some individual U.S. tariffs 
are quite high. Tariffs on textiles average 20 percent. Duties on fruit 
juices are over 27 percent, and the rate on ceramic products is over 14 
percent. Table 4 shows the major high tariff items. In 1980, these specific 
tariffs represented, in the aggregate, 11.9 percent of the value of the 
imports in the categories shown. 
Miscellaneous Barriers to U.S. Exports 
The United States conducts a great variety of domestic regulatory 
activities which inevitably affect the relative prices of competing U.S. 
and foreign goods and services. In some cases, foreign producers are not 
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TABLE 4 
Major U.S. High-Tariff Items, 1980 
(Value in Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
Average 
Product Value Duty Tariff 
Agricultural Products 
Dairy Products $ 314.2 $ 29.8 9.50Jo 
Vegetables 659.9 74.5 11.3 
Beverages 2,255.4 153.3 6.8 
Fruit Juices (143.6) (39. 7) (27.6) 
Tobacco 486.6 59.5 12.2 
Manufactured Products 
Wood Veneers 612.5 56.9 9.3 
Textiles 8,152.1 1,792.8 22.0 
Apparel (5,499.8) (1,468.9) (26.7) 
Benzoid Chemicals 1,444.1 197.0 13.0 
Synthetic Resins 159.8 16.4 10.3 
Ceramic Products 968.7 140.1 14.5 
Glass Products 603.6 66.1 10.9 
Specified Products 17,240.0 1,319.8 7.7 
Footwear (3,975.4) (493.7) (12.4) 
Jewelry (820.9) (82.9) (10.1) 
Matches (120.3) (13.5) (11.2) 
Miscellaneous Products 298.4 37.8 12.7 
TOTAL $33,196.3 $3,944.0 11.9 
Source: Statistical Services Division, U.S. International Trade Commission. 
subject to similar burdens. In many other instances, the social objectives 
of other nations are achieved at lower cost. For example, a recent com-
parison of U.S. environmental regulatory policy with that of the United 
Kingdom concluded that our government's approach has been relatively 
insensitive to the objectives and unresponsive to the objections of private 
enterprise, and that our regulatory regime is "more coercive than in any 
other industrial democracy."5 
The details of the burdens imposed by domestic regulation on Ameri-
can producers have been fully documented elsewhere. 6 In addition, there 
are important special burdens that the Federal Government has imposed 
on companies involved in foreign trade. 
For example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 requires strict 
record-keeping standards to monitor the anti-bribery sections of the stat-
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utes. Violators of the Act face severe penalties. A company may be fined 
up to $1 million, while its officers who directly participate in violations 
or have reason to know of them face up to five years in prison and 
$10,000 in fines. Frankly, it is difficult to raise any discussion of the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act without being criticized for being callous on 
ethical matters. However, this statute has been cited for establishing a 
regulatory regime that displays the same cavalier attitude toward the bur-
dens it imposes as do many other well-intentioned regulations. Thus, the 
key questions is not "Are you in favor of bribes?" but rather, "How can 
the law be carried out most effectively and with minimum adverse side 
effects?" 
The Federal Government imposes many special 
burdens on companies involved in foreign trade 
A former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
agency administering the Act, has stated, "the anxieties created by the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-among men and women of utmost good 
faith-have been, in my experience, without equal."' A study of U.S. 
export competitiveness by the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies at Georgetown University concluded that the language of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is so sweeping and ambiguous that Ameri-
can firms turn down foreign business when they merely suspect that they 
could be charged with bribery. Thus, business people are forced into 
marketing approaches that are "unnaturally conservative."8 
One of the major criticisms of the Act is that it has cost American 
firms export opportunities without reducing the level of foreign corrup-
tion. By precluding American firms from taking part in questionable 
transactions, which may be perfectly legal and acceptable practices in 
many other nations, the Act reduces the ability of U.S. firms to compete 
overseas. The General Accounting Office has found in a survey of 250 
American companies that 30 percent of the respondents that engaged in 
foreign business had lost business as a result of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act. The GAO has recommended that Congress amend the Act 
to clarify several important provisions.9 
U.S. anti-boycott laws and regulations are designed to limit the extent 
to which foreign boycotts can affect U.S. domestic commerce or trade 
with nations other than the boycotting nations. Several specific statutes 
were enacted in response to the boycott of Israel by the Arab league, 
such as the Anti-Boycott Amendments to the Export Administration Act 
of 1977 and the Ribicoff Amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1976. As 
a result of the anti-boycott rules, a number of U.S. companies, particu-
larly those located in Arab countries, claim that they have lost sales. 
Also, some business executives have complained that the recordkeeping 
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and reporting requirements of the multiple anti-boycott provisions raise 
the cost of production. 
In addition to these highly publicized activities, several environmental 
programs impose requirements with regard to exports. For example, the 
regulations under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
require exporters to notify countries for which products are destined that 
a hazardous product is being exported 30 days in advance of the 
export-even if the product is not viewed as hazardous under the laws of 
the importing country. The importing nation must notify the exporter 
that the notice was received. No other country has such a restriction. 
At times, domestic regulation (in the United States and elsewhere) has 
been used to restrict imports. For example, a major U.S. barrier to 
imports is the array of state and local building codes. Government 
authorities typically enact the codes that are drawn up by private build-
ing associations. This procedure opens the way for imposing discrimina-
tory standards favorable to the local industry. Ceramic tile provides a 
good example. After Japanese imports captured much of the U.S. mar-
ket for floor tile in the 1960s, many building codes were revised to screen 
out imported wall tile by requiring a thickness of one-fourth inch. That 
rule disallowed the import of tile produced in Japan and Europe, which 
had a standard 5/32 inch thickness. 10 
The Export Administration Act mandates trade 
controls over many products-including 
certain domestic crude oil and petroleum 
products, unprocessed red cedar, and 
horses exported by sea 
Export Controls 
Despite the general desire of public policymakers to promote exports, 
many U.S. statutes prevent or restrict the export of specific commodi-
ties. The Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973 prohibits the 
export of oil from North Slope fields. Public Law 94-373, a rider to the 
Appropriation Act for the Interior Department and related agencies, 
bans timber exports from federal lands west of the 100th meridian. 
The Export Administration Act of 1979 provides for controls on 
exports of goods and technology which would make a significant contri-
bution to the military potential of any other nation or nations and which 
would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. 
The Act was used to deny an export license for the sale of a Sperry-
Univac computer to the Soviet News Agency TASS. The French quickly 
permitted Honeywell-Bull to sell TASS a computer. 
As mentioned previously, the Export Administration Act mandates per-
manent controls over a variety of products, including certain domesti-
cally produced crude oil, certain refined petroleum products, certain 
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unprocessed red cedar, and horses exported by sea. In 1980 the Act was 
employed to embargo grain exports to the Soviet Union for national 
security reasons. It was invoked again in 1982 to carry out the ban 
against U.S. firms (and their overseas subsidiaries and licensees) partici-
pating in the construction of the natural gas pipeline between the USSR 
and Western Europe. 
One academic study of U.S. export controls in the 1970s concluded 
that, while the great majority of applications for approval under the 
Export Administration Act are promptly reviewed, the more sensitive 
requests "get tied up in a bureaucratic morass." 11 Although a 1974 
amendment to the Act placed a 90-day limit on license reviews, the aver-
age time required for reviews that went to the operating congressional 
committee in 1975 was 224 days. The author of the study concluded that 
"there is considerable evidence to conclude that the licensing system has 
indeed been a powerful disincentive to exports.'' 12 The General Account-
ing Office has also studied the area of export licenses for commercial 
items and found that the government "carefully examines less than 1 out 
of 20 export applications it processes, resulting in a licensing system 
which bears more resemblance to a paper exercise than a control 
mechanism." 13 
Export controls call into question 
the reliability of the U.S. as a 
supplier of products to other countries 
Export controls do more than limit U.S. international trade for the 
time they are imposed. These restrictions call into question the reliability 
of the United States as a supplier of products to other countries, which 
are likely to develop alternative sources. A clear example is soybeans. 
The main effect of the U.S. controls over soybean exports in 1974 was to 
induce Japan to turn to other producing countries, particularly Brazil. 
Japan invested huge amounts to develop alternatives to U.S. production, 
thus effectively and permanently reducing our share of the world soy-
bean market. 14 
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IV. The Case for Freer Trade 
Given the widespread use of protectionist devices to inhibit the flow of 
trade among nations, it may be useful to examine the key conceptual and 
historical justification for maintaining and achieving an open trading sys-
tem. The case for freer trade is rooted in a basic economic law: the prin-
ciple of comparative advantage, which holds that total economic welfare 
will be enhanced if each nation specializes in the production of items that 
it can produce, in relative terms, most efficiently. This, of course, is an 
important case of Adam Smith's more general point concerning the 
advantages of the specialization of labor. 1 
Historical Experience 
The arguments in favor of freer trade are supported by a great deal of 
historical evidence. Through most of the twentieth century, the United 
States has played a strong leadership role in developing the world trading 
system. During the 1930s, however, the United States and many other 
countries followed "beggar-thy-neighbor" trade policies which contrib-
uted to the worldwide depression. The Smoot-Hawley protectionist tariff 
epitomized this approach in the United States. The results for many com-
panies were extremely negative. For example, firms that had relied on 
substantial foreign business were limited to the domestic market, which 
for some was inadequate for survival. 
During the 1930s, the U.S. and many other 
countries followed trade policies that 
contributed to the worldwide depression 
After World War II, this country embarked on a program of reciprocal 
trade agreements. Initially arranged bilaterally, they evolved into the fur-
ther improved multilateral trading system of the postwar years. This 
approach broke down many of the historical barriers to world trade. An 
especially fine example occurred in the 1960s: the acceleration in world 
trade and economic growth in that decade followed a sharp and mutual 
reduction in tariff barriers which contributed to lower prices for con-
sumers. We continue today to reap benefits from the policies initiated in 
the those years. 2 
We can turn to our own economic history for earlier examples of the 
benefits of an open economy. This country began as a trading nation. If 
the concept of "Gross National Product" had existed in the 18th and 
19th centuries, people would have pointed to the United States as one of 
the more open economies in the world, as measured by the share of GNP 
involved in foreign trade-although tariff debates were common through-
out the 19th century. In its early years, the United States was among the 
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mo~e trad~-oriented ~conomies in the world. We were major suppliers of 
a wide vanety of agncultural exports and raw materials and of such del-
. . ' Ica~Ies as rum. In addition, our service exports, such as shipping, were 
an Important economic activity. We were a major importer of manufac-
tured goods and a major recipient of foreign capital. These factors con-
tinued to play a critical role in the development of the American 
economy during the 19th century. 
Around the turn of the century the dynamics of the American econ-
omy shifted. Exports and imports became smaller shares of GNP and 
remained ~ather stable. U.S. investment abroad increased, gradually 
transforming us from an international debtor into a world creditor. 
Increasingly, we became a self -sufficient economy. Only in the last 20 
years has the international sector once again begun to increase its relative 
importance in our economy. 
Despite the concern about a U.S. merchandise 
trade deficit, the U.S. runs a steady surplus 
when we consider goods and services 
Foreign trade is now an important element in U.S. business and 
employment. In 1980, exports and imports of goods and services each 
represented over 12 percent of our Gross National Product (see Table 5). 
Twenty years ago, exports were less than 6 percent of GNP; imports, less 
~han 5 percent. Much of this shift has occurred in the past decade, when 
Imports and exports as a share of GNP have doubled and a positive 
export balance has been maintained. Despite all the concern about a U.S. 
merchandise trade deficit, it is clear from Table 1 (in the first section of 
TABLE 5 
Trade in the U.S. Economy, 1960-1980* 
(Dollars in billions) 
1960 1970 
Percent Percent 
1980 
Percent 
Amount of GNP Amount of GNP Amount of GNP 
Exports of goods 
and services $28.9 5.70Jo $65.7 6.60Jo $339.8 12.90Jo 
Imports of goods 
and services 23.4 4.6 59.0 5.9 316.5 12.1 
Net exports $ 5.5 1.1 ll!o $ 6.7 0.60Jo $ 23.3 0.80Jo 
* Data are on a national income accounts basis. All figures are rounded. 
Source: Department of Commerce 
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the study) that this country runs a steady surplus when we consider both 
goods and services. In an economy that increasingly has been shifting 
toward a service orientation, any analysis of international economic 
activity that ignores the important service sector surely is inadequate. 
Figures 2A and 2B illustrate this point dramatically, and Figure 2C shows 
how the import of services has contributed to a net trade surplus for 
most of the last decade. 
It is interesting to note two often overlooked facts: (1) In real terms, 
the rate of growth in U.S. imports of goods and services was stronger in 
the 1960s than in the 1970s (8.0 percent versus 5.0 percent), and (2) U.S. 
export growth, by contrast, was stronger in the 1970s than in the 1960s 
(8.6 percent versus 6.3 percent; see Table 6). While the reasons have not 
TABLE 6 
Real Growth of U.S. Trade and GNP, 1960-1980 
(Average Annual Percentage Increases) 
1960-1970 
Exports of goods and services 
Imports of goods and services 
6.30Jo 
8.0 
GNP 4.0 
Source: Department of Commerce 
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U.S. Trade Balance on Current Account, 
Goods plus Services, 1973-1982 
*Estimated annualized basis. 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce data on current account basis. 
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been fully explored, it seems likely that our export growth performance 
reflected three key factors: 
• Our increased trade with developin~ countries, whose GNP growth 
slowed less in the 1970s than that of the developed countries. 
• Our specialization in production and trade of high-technology 
products of agricultural commodities, and of services. 
• The evol~ing ramifications of the trade liberalization of the post-
war period. 
In passing, we should note that there is a close, but not generally 
appreciated, connection between imports and exports. A strong trade 
position requires both a high volume of imports and a high volume of 
exports. In fact, the only way, in the long run, to increase a country's 
exports is to increase its imports. U.S. exporters need to find foreign 
buyers with the dollars necessary to buy their goods and services. In gen-
eral, these dollars are obtained when Americans import and pay for for-
eign goods and services. 
In the short run, it is true that we can and do lend foreigners the dol-
lars with which to buy our exports. When such loans are made at market 
rates of interest, trade is properly advanced. But when government-
subsidized credit is provided, such funds are denied to other, more pro-
ductive uses in the domestic economy. 
Thus, imports put dollars in the hands of foreigners-which can then 
be used to buy our exports. It follows that restrictions in imports will 
result in fewer dollars in the hands of those in other countries who might 
wish to buy our wheat, aircraft, chemicals or machinery-unless we wish 
to make up the difference by loans or transfer payments to foreigners. 3 
In some cases, the connection between imports and exports is even 
more direct. Import restraints can reduce employment and profits in our 
more productive export industries, in many cases in the same region of 
the country. For example, in the non-rubber footwear industry, U.S. 
exports of hides to foreign shoe producers suffered as a result of our 
restraints on the import of foreign shoes. 
Open trade lowers inflationary pressures 
by increasing the supply of goods and services 
competing for the consumer~ dollar 
The Benefits of Free Trade 
At this point it may be useful to attempt to generalize from historical 
experience. The benefits of freer trade are numerous: 
• Open trade contributes to lowering inflationary pressures by increasing 
the supply of goods and services competing for the consumer's dollar. 
Thus, the question of free trade is basically a consumer issue, and an 
extremely important one. 
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• Open trade minimizes the role of government in influencing private-
sector decisions, thus allowing individuals and business firms to respond 
to the needs and pressures of the international marketplace. Viewed in 
this light, freer trade is key to promoting economic freedom and the pri-
vate enterprise system. 
• Open trade improves the efficiency with which our own resources are 
allocated and thereby yields more growth, higher levels of employment, 
and an improved living standard here at home. 
Open trade yields more growth, 
higher levels of employment, and an 
improved standard of living here at home 
Aside from the direct and measurable aspects, trade stimulates compe-
tition, stirs creative energies, rewards individual initiative, and increases 
national productivity. Among nations, it speeds the exchange of new 
ideas and technology. In the long run, international trade means the crea-
tion of new jobs and the reduction of inflation. In sum, it contributes to 
a healthier economy-one with more job opportunities and a wider vari-
ety of goods and services. 
The Costs of Protectionism 
In this time of great interest in benefit/cost analysis, we may properly 
inquire as to what are the costs of free trade as well as the benefits. The 
obvious costs are borne by the workers who become unemployed as a 
result of imports-assuming that imports are the cause. What is less 
apparent, however, is that any form of trade restraint to help a specific 
industry really is an internal transfer of income and wealth to that indus-
try from U.S. consumers (in the form of higher prices for domestically 
produced goods and services) and from American workers and owners of 
our export industries, who bear the brunt of retaliatory trade restrictions 
in the form of lower wages and lower profits. 
The question of free trade is basically 
a consumer issue 
Moreover, many of the benefits of protectionist measures, even to the 
group advocating them, can turn out to be very temporary. For example, 
quotas on shoe imports resulted in an upgrading in the quality of 
imports. Thus, American producers found themselves threatened in that 
part of the market in which, prior to the protectionist action, they firmly 
dominated. The same process is visible in the current case of "voluntary" 
restraints of Japanese auto imports. 
One of the great difficulties in public policy discussions involving pro-
tectionist measures is that the beneficiaries are usually few in number, 
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but each has a large individual stake in the outcome. Moreover, they 
have little concern about the likelihood of retaliation by foreign govern-
ments on other American industries. Thus, the incentive for vigorous and 
concentrated political activity is strong. 
In addition, pleas for protectionism reflect the ability of relatively 
small but influential groups to convince legislatures to adopt policies that 
benefit them, albeit at the expense of citizens at large. The balance of 
power is extremely uneven, given the limited knowledge that consumers 
currently have about these matters. Those who benefit from exports and 
from the greater supply of goods and services are generally not even 
aware of the process by which they benefit. Although the benefits of 
open trade may far exceed the costs, those benefits-such as lower prices 
to consumers-are widely diffused among 50 states and 225 million resi-
dents. Any single consumer's stake in the outcome is quite small. The 
individual consumer almost surely is not aware of why the price of a 
given item is going down-or not rising. Consequently, resistance at the 
grass roots level to protectionist measures so often is considerably less 
than pressures for their adoption. 
A great difficulty in protectionist measures 
is that the beneficiaries are few in number, 
but each has a large stake in the outcome 
Scholarly studies typically show that the total benefits of freer trade-
savings to consumers, gains from moving resources out of inefficient sec-
tors, stimulus to investment, and increased economies of scale-far 
exceed the costs. One study concluded that the benefits of tariff reduc-
tions are approximately 80 times as large as the costs of labor adjust-
ments (the latter measured in terms of the unemployment resulting from 
increased imports). High ratios of economic benefits of trade liberaliza-
tion to labor adjustment costs have also been estimated for other 
nations, ranging from 49 to 1 in Japan to 96 to 1 in the European Eco-
nomic Community. 4 These ratios of costs of protection to benefits, it 
should be noted, are much higher than the specific numbers cited in the 
earlier section on the auto industry. However, both the aggregate and 
specific comparisons show that the benefits of protectionist measures are 
far less than the total costs imposed on society. 
Clearly, if an economy is to reap the benefits of free international 
trade, it also must incur the costs. These costs may be seen as the various 
resource-adjustment costs and income-redistribution problems associated 
with specialization and trade. Trade changes relative prices and, thus, 
forces reallocations of resources. Over time, a nation engaged in trade 
experiences further changes in relative costs, technology, and tastes-all 
of which, in turn, alter the composition of its exports, imports, and 
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domestic production. The adjustments do not occur instantaneously, and 
after the transition, the benefits are not distributed evenly throughout the 
economy. Nevertheless, typically the consumer savings from freer trade 
more than justify the adjustment programs instituted for those who are 
initially hurt by the change. s 
The question is frequently asked, "Other nations do not have a policy 
of freer trade, so why should we?" But rather than talking in absolutes, 
the more appropriate question to ask is, "Are the trade policies of other 
nations more open today than they would be without the continued pres-
sure of agreed international 'rules of the game' -rules often developed 
under the persistent and patient influence of the U.S. Government?" The 
answer is a resounding "yes." Trade policy, here and elsewhere, is far 
more open today as a result of our efforts and of our example of a rela-
tively open domestic market. 
Is the U.S. better off with this incremental improvement than without 
it? Again, the response is positive. The goods we import are cheaper 
than domestic substitutes. Our 225 million consumers have more choice. 
The markets for our exports are less restricted than they might otherwise 
be. And these points are abstracted from the income-generating effects of 
increased trade. Yet it is also true that if trade were still more open, soci-
ety as a whole would be still better off. On the other hand, increasing 
our own trade restrictions-whether for retaliatory reasons or 
otherwise-runs the risk of setting us on a path leading back toward the 
policies of the 1930s. 
The international counterpart of our domestic 
support for a market-oriented, private enterprise 
economy must be a policy of strong opposition 
to trade-distorting interventions 
by all governments 
That does not mean that we must advocate a passive policy toward 
other nations' trade barriers or export subsidies. The international coun-
terpart of our domestic support for a market-oriented, private enterprise 
economy must be a policy of strong opposition to trade-distorting inter-
ventions by all governments, our own as well as all others. The credibil-
ity of this country's commitment to open and freer trade is not enhanced 
by companies sending their lawyers to Washington on Monday to seek 
the removal of import barriers overseas, and then turning around on 
Wednesday to send the same attorneys back to Washington to advocate 
import restrictions on the products of their foreign competitors. 
The benefits and opportunities of an open trading system are hard to 
overestimate. For example, despite the many real obstacles, quite a few 
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American companies have experienced significant success in penetrating 
Japanese markets. It is reported that Coca-Cola is the largest-selling soft 
drink in Japan, Schick is number one in the razor market and Nestle 
commands 70 percent of the instant coffee market. 6 
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V. A Modern Approach to Trade Policy 
If any single finding has emerged from the preceding analysis of 
domestic and foreign obstacles to trade among nations, it is that no 
nation has clean hands in this regard. Surely, many foreign nations have 
erected a multitude of barriers against the importation of goods and 
services. Some of these nations, not too surprisingly, run large trade sur-
pluses with the United States and other countries. But, also, some of 
these nations that have a wide variety of obstacles to our exports never-
theless experience substantial trade deficits with us and with other 
nations. Specifically, the public is well aware of the large amounts of 
Japanese goods that are imported into the United States and the excess 
of our imports from that country over our exports. But how many of 
our citizens are also aware of the large trade surpluses that we run with 
Western Europe, often of the same order of magnitude as our deficits 
with Japan? 
If anything is clear in this murky area, it is that the protectionist 
approach does not guarantee a nation of a positive balance in its trade 
account, even if that is deemed desirable. Surely, the American experi-
ence demonstrates that, when this nation erected high tariff walls, such 
action was not followed by times of domestic prosperity. Conversely, eras 
characterized by lowering trade walls usually ushered in periods of eco-
nomic growth. Advocates of protectionist measures also tend to ignore 
the fact that such measures lead to foreign retaliation. 
There is a noticeable "demonstration" or copycat effect that can work 
constructively or negatively. As the largest trading nation in the world, 
our actions inevitably set both the tone and the standards for many other 
countries. When we erect trade walls, other nations tend to match us-
and the present environment of relatively troubled international trade 
provides a congent example. The worldwide response to U.S. actions is 
avowedly slower on the way down, but that may be inevitable, given the 
greater dependence on foreign trade on the part of most other developed 
nations. 
On reflection, this sequence of events should be expected: when the 
forces of competition are strengthened and broadened, the prospects for 
productivity growth are enhanced and our domestic industries tend to 
experience improved competitiveness in world markets. Conversely, when 
companies get in the habit of looking to the government for help, their 
own entrepreneurial and risk-taking characteristics are attenuated. In any 
event, extended periods of recession and slow growth have tended to 
exacerbate protectionist pressures, while such pressures are generally 
reduced during periods of rapid growth and rising employment. 
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Domestic Reforms in Trade Policy 
1. Fundamental to any effective trade policy is establishing and carry-
ing out a domestic economic policy that increases the incentives to invest 
and produce, to raise productivity, and to reduce costs-and so helps 
raise domestic incomes and lower inflation. These policies strengthen the 
ability of American firms to respond to constant changes in domestic 
and international markets. All this suggests that an enlightened and 
effective approach to international trade policy should begin with general 
economic policies that encourage competition and provide greater incen-
tives to the key factors that generate sustained economic growth and 
reduced inflation. Examples of those incentives range from lowering tax 
burdens that discourage saving and work effort to curtailing regulatory 
requirements that inhibit research and development, investment, and pro-
duction to reducing the deficit financing that competes with private 
investment for available savings. 
2. In addition to those general economic measures, we need simultane-
ously to cut back the many confusing and unnecessarily burdensome laws 
and regulations that inhibit our exports as well as our imports. As has 
been amply demonstrated, the United States maintains an extensive array 
of regulatory requirements on domestic production. Few of these bur-
dens can be shown to generate more benefits than costs to the society. In 
many instances, the burdens are far greater than is the case in other 
industrialized nations. Furthermore, the United States directly restricts 
the export of a great variety of items, usually for foreign policy or 
national security reasons. These restrictions have ranged from weapons 
and nuclear power plants to goods that are deemed "strategic," to grain, 
timber, and petroleum and items to be used in the natural gas pipeline 
between the USSR and Western Europe. It should be noted that impor-
tant indirect costs result from using the embargo mechanism to pursue 
noneconomic objectives. The repeated instances discourage American 
companies from pursuing an export-oriented market strategy and cause 
foreign markets to turn to more secure sources of supply. 
We need to cut back the many, burdensome 
laws and regulations that inhibit 
our imports and exports 
The International Orientation in Trade Policy 
3. We need to fundamentally revise our attitude toward multinational 
corporations and acknowledge their positive role in a healthy world 
economy. 
Companies that are multinational in their operations tend to adapt to 
change more readily and are less likely to plead for protection than other 
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companies. Many specific aspects of public policy toward American 
overseas business need to be reconsidered. One candidate for review is 
the detailed regulations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act which often 
inadvertently and unnecessarily limit the ability of United States compan-
ies to compete in overseas markets. Outright bribery is not to be con-
doned. But "special commissions" are standard business practice in many 
parts of the world and reflect local customs rather than American initia-
tive. Also, the anti-boycott law may reduce American business potential 
in some Arab states. Because many of these obstacles to our exports 
reflect important social objectives, the solution in this area may, in part, 
entail convincing other nations to adopt similar approaches. Neverthe-
less, there is a compelling case for reviewing existing regulations to deter-
mine which of them can be modified to a more cost/ effective stance. 
We must acknowledge the positive role 
played by multinational corporations 
in a healthy world economy 
4. As a nation we need to understand that, from the viewpoint of eco-
nomic performance, protectionist measures are counterproductive. They 
reduce competition. By encouraging resources to move into or stay in less 
efficient industries, they result in lower growth in productivity in the 
overall economy. That, in turn, adversely affects our competitiveness in 
world markets and-almost predictably-generates further pressure for 
additional protectionist measures. The result is lower domestic employ-
ment, which, in turn, often generates additional pressures for govern-
ment interference. That is an example of a more general principle: 
government intervention begets more government intervention. 
In a healthy and dynamic economy we must expect that some indus-
tries and regions will grow more rapidly than others and that some sec-
tors will experience more difficulty. We must rely primarily on market 
forces, and not on government bailouts, to make the appropriate adjust-
ments. 
In certain situations the adjustments to import press~res are not easy. 
For example, as a result of changes in resource endowments or the 
spread of technology, know-how, and entrepreneurial activity abroad, it 
may become apparent that the United States no longer has an economic 
basis for producing various labor-intensive products that require little 
skill or capital. In these circumstances, our domestic industry must either 
find a way of upgrading its own capabilities or shift resources to other 
activities. And in these situations, primary reliance again should be 
placed on market forces to facilitate those adjustments in the affected 
industries. 
5. The emphasis in trade adjustment policies should be just that: 
adjustment, not preservation of an uncompetitive industrial structure. A 
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healthy, dynamic economy is a flexible economy, where business execu-
tives, consumers, and workers have a continuing opportunity to invest 
their capital, tailor their budgets, and find employment in response to 
market forces unaffected by artificial government barriers or props. 
Thus, while there may be a role for government assistance to individual 
workers who have lost employment because of import dislocations, this 
assistance should be temporary-and oriented toward facilitating their 
search for new employment in other industries and, conceivably, in other 
locations. The general rule in trade adjustment situations should be to 
help individuals, not industries per se. 
Free Trade as a Two-Way Street 
How, then, should the United States respond to the vast array of pro-
tectionist measures put in place by its friends and allies around the 
world? Of course, we cannot ignore them. As a practical matter, free 
trade must be a two-way street. But we cannot harp at foreign barriers 
while we blithely ignore our own. As this report has demonstrated, the 
United States maintains a great many restrictions on imports-precisely 
the kinds of actions that we berate others for taking. 
6. In responding to foreign obstacles to our trade, the serious question 
is how to develop policies aimed at increasing freer flows of trade and 
investment with our trading partners without harming the present inter-
national trading system or starting a spiral of protectionist actions. 
We cannot harp at foreign trade barriers 
while we blithely ignore our own 
Our objective should be a policy that lowers-not raises-barriers, and 
opens-not closes-markets. The current interest in "reciprocity" should 
not mean a focus on equivalent access on a sector-by-sector or product-
by-product basis. By all means, it should not be a guise for protectionist 
actions. Most important, the need for reciprocity should not be deter-
mined by whether or not the U.S. has a trade deficit with a particular 
country. The primary and preferable method for responding to the pres-
sures for "reciprocity" should be by dealing with the serious concerns 
that give rise to those pressures, such as surges of imports. That positive 
response should be in the form of seeking liberalization of foreign mar-
kets rather than by raising equivalently restrictive barriers in our own. 
A most salutary action on the part of the United States was the 
November 13, 1982, announcement of the termination of the ban on 
American firms (and their subsidiaries and licensees) participating in the 
construction of the natural gas pipeline between the USSR and Western 
Europe. A constructive follow-on action would be the elimination of one 
or more of our subsidy programs for agricultural commodities-such as 
sugar and dairy products-to be made contingent on Western Europe 
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beginning to reduce the vast array of subsidies and supports to its agri-
cultural sectors. Certainly, the American consumer and taxpayer would 
benefit from those actions, as would their counterparts overseas. 
To this end, the United States government should continue its efforts 
to improve the existing rules of the game for trade in goods-particularly 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the codes devel-
oped in the Multilateral Trade Negotiations. It is not too soon to start 
the long process of developing new sets of international rules relating to 
the rapidly expanding trade in services. 
The battle for open markets must be waged at many levels and in vari-
ous arenas. If the foregoing analysis has relevance for American con-
sumers, it surely has even greater relevance for Japanese consumers. 
And, of course, it is the Japanese public that bears the ultimate burden 
of the vast array of trade restrictions, both formal and informal, that is 
maintained by that nation. Viewed from a broad, historical perspective, 
Japan, of all the major developed nations, is the one which most recently 
has made the transition from a developing country to a mature, industri-
alized economy. However, the Japanese have only begun to change their 
policies and customs to reflect that fundamental shift. The "infant indus-
try" approach has not yet been abandoned. Yet, looking at the decade of 
The battle for open markets has even greater 
relevance for Japanese consumers 
the 1980s, it is clear that Japan now has a key stake in the health of the 
world trading system. Japan has benefitted greatly from the openness of 
the world economy. Without that liberal environment, it is doubtful that 
its export-led growth would have occurred. Surely, steps to open that 
nation's markets more widely to foreign trade and investment seem long 
overdue. 
7. The sooner that Japan succeeds in adjusting its trade posture to cur-
rent economic realities worldwide, the sooner will its trade relations with 
open advanced economies move to a sustainable basis. As the "Wise-
men's Report" (the Report of the Japan-United States Economic Rela-
tions Group, January 1981) so clearly stated, Japan "needs to develop 
and articulate a new, more active international role. Japan should strive 
to substantially improve access to its market." The Wisemen-a very dis-
tinguished group of former business and government leaders of Japan 
and the United States-specifically urged Japan to strive "to substan-
tially improve access to its market" and to join the United States in pro-
viding international leadership in setting an example and in strengthening 
the institutions and practices supporting freer flows of trade, capital, and 
technology. 
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Towards a Freer World Economy 
In the current economic environment, in which pressures for protec-
tionism run strong, improving the "rules of the game" for free trade is 
not especially easy. The demands for restricting a wide variety of imports 
to the U.S. are myriad and often carry s~rong influence in government. 
In this regard, then, the central question may be, how can the tide effec-
tively be turned? Or, more precisely, how do we maintain and improve 
our free markets and the benefits that flow from them? 
8. In its fundamental form, the answer to rising protectionist pressures 
lies in efforts that combine vigorous education with strong persuasion. 
To that end, much of this report has been devoted to setting forth the 
range of adverse economic effects-both domestic and international-
resulting from tightening or closing off world access to our domestic 
markets. In particular, the key feature of protectionism that cannot be 
stressed too strongly is its pronounced effects on American consumers-
people who buy goods and services every day but who are not aware, in 
large part, of the negative results which restricted world trade has on 
their pocketbooks and standard of living. Protection is, in effect, a hid-
den tax on the consumer, and often an extremely regressive one. 
The key feature of protectionism is 
its pronounced effect on American consumers 
Additionally, it is important to point out that American industries will, 
ironically, suffer rather than benefit from protection from imports, either 
in the short or long run. By reducing domestic competition and raising 
the prices of goods-all in the name of protecting American industries 
and jobs-consumption and output are consequently reduced, inflation is 
ignited, jobs and incomes are lost, and the economy as a whole suffers 
damage. Seen in this light, protectionism cannot be viewed as the remedy 
to an illness; rather, it is, itself, an illness. 
On the one hand, businesses and American workers alike must be 
pressed on this point. If the vitality of free markets and the interests of 
private enterprise are to be well served, then the "quick fix" of trade 
barriers must be avoided, since the damage they cause-though often 
subtle in their workings-far outweighs the benefits that accrue to spe-
cific, protected industries. Moreover, the "snowball" effect of protection-
ism can be very strong, because once the precedent is established in one 
industry, others will seek the same sorts of protection from government. 
On the other hand, policymakers in government must recognize that 
they face an important task not only in seeking to reduce the barriers 
imposed by foreign governments on American exports, but also in 
reforming or removing many of our own obstacles to the export of U.S. 
goods. If American firms are to compete effectively in world markets, 
the wide range of domestic laws and regulations hindering trade must be 
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revised. The sig~ing into law in October of the Export Trading Compan 
Act of 1982, .whtch "":ill enco.urage joint export ventures by giving firms y 
s~me protections agamst antitrust actions, is certainly a step in the right 
~Irect10n.' More must be done, however, at all levels of government and 
m the pnvate sector itself to promote the sale of U.S. goods overseas by 
removmg our own barriers to trade. 
. If American firms are to compete effectively 
m world markets, the wide range of domestic laws 
and regulations hindering trade must be revised 
In the final analysis, government officials, American business, work-
ers, ~nd consumers .will ~e~efit from understanding-and putting into 
pra~tic~-a few baste prmctples regarding the crucial area of U.S. partici-
pat.IOn m world trade. These principles are central to the free market on 
whtch our economy is based: 
• ~eri.can. firms and the millions of people who depend on them for 
thetr. l~v.e~thoods must recognize that open trade presents far more 
posstbiltties for them than does closing U.S. markets. In simple 
terms, open markets create more business opportunities; restricted 
markets do not. 
• Trade barriers such as import restrictions and forced "reciprocity" 
~hould .not be used as a political rationalization for dealing with 
mdustnal problems that are essentially of domestic origin. 
• lmpo~tant multilateral agreements on trade should be maintained 
and VIgorously pursued. At the same time, foreign governments 
should be made aware, at every turn, of the domestic pressures in 
the. U.S. for res~ricting markets. Moreover, the wide variety of non-
tanff trade barners that are so prevalent in the world today should 
be exposed to the glare of publicity. 
• While the full spectrum of businesses in the United States should 
clearly enunciate its views on world trade, American firms must also 
look at both sides of the coin. As the world's largest importer and 
exporter, .the .u.s. runs trade deficits with Japan, while it simultane-
ously mru~tams large trade surpluses with Western Europe and other 
wo~l~ regions. Put another way, we should not ignore our own com-
petitive advantages by concentrating solely on those of other 
nations. 
• M~reover, in an economy which avowedly has become more service-
one~ted, we need to overcome our historic preoccupation with com-
modity trade. Rather, we need to focus on the total flows of 
com.merce between the United States and other nations, including 
services as well as goods, and investments as well as current account 
~ransa~tions. After all, it is from the totality of our economic deal-
mgs With other economies that we gain the totality of benefits from 
a more open exchange of things-and ideas. 
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With these principles in mind, if the United States-which is the major 
trading nation in the world-takes the initiative, we could change the 
entire tenor of economic and foreign trade policy relationships with the 
world, particularly with Western Europe and Japan. Rather than contin-
uing down a road of increasing trade tensions and worsening overall rela-
tionships, such an enlightened change in our policies and actions would 
provide a fine opportunity for embarking on a period of more open 
trade and investment and creating an improved environment for achiev-
ing this nation's general foreign policy objectives. 
50 
